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The Black Book of Sudan claims to identify a pattern of political 
control  – by people of its northern regions  – which is unbroken 
during the post-independence period. This is the basis for the view of 
many of the rebels in the south and west of the country that the 
conflicts are the result not of racial or religious discrimination but 
rather of regional marginalisation. This paper uses the available 
data to evaluate the extent to which differences in regional access to 
power have resulted in differential human development progress. 
Indicators ranging from infant mortality to adult literacy, coupled 
with data on regional expenditure allocations, offer substantial 
support to the idea that policy has discriminated against the 
population of the southern and western regions, not least Darfur. 
The danger is that development community efforts that do not 
recognise the basis for the conflict may facilitate a continuation of 
the same distortions and sow the seeds for future conflict even before 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Since February 2003, the government of Sudan has conducted a campaign of genocidal 
ethnic cleansing in Darfur, using both its military forces and militia proxies the 
Janjaweed. Estimates of fatalities have climbed steadily to 70,000 people while more 
than two million have been displaced.
2 Recognition of this violence has eventually 
brought significant pressure for a halt, and internationally brokered negotiations are 
underway.   
 
Media coverage has been dominated by views of the conflict as racial (‘Arab’ against 
‘African’) and religious (the Muslim north against the largely Christian and animist 
south). The main claims of rebel groups however have been of  regional rather than 
racial or religious discrimination. The Black Book of Sudan, published secretly in the 
capital Khartoum in 2000 and then widely circulated through photocopying, had a major 
impact on political discussion. The book’s first part (in English translation: Anonymous, 
2004a) sets out the extent  to which governments of different persuasions have 
disproportionately appointed citizens from the northern regions in all areas of 
government, at the expense of all others.  
 
‘Sudan was not ideal at its Independence in 1956. Resources were poorly divided among 
different provinces at the time. By the 1970s some progress was made and gaps between 
provinces started narrowing. The last two decades have been different. Resources were 
moved to concentrate in the Northern and Central Regions leading to impoverishment of 
other Regions. […] Destruction of marginalized Regions has become a feature of Sudan, 
particularly during the reign of [the] current Regime’ (p.31). 
 
El-Tom (2004) sets out how northern Sudanese took their opportunity at independence 
in claiming a fitness to lead that stemmed from their scientific rationality, as opposed to 
the barbarism of other Sudanese. This was justified by a political discourse of 
‘Arabization’, which over time became closely linked to Islam.
3 Mamdani (2004) 
confirms the difference between understandings of ‘Arab’ as an ethnic, cultural and 
political concept in the Sudan, and the use made by at least the current government of 
the latter.  
 
El-Tom highlights that the discourse is used to the extent that it supports the elite’s 
claims to dominance; but not beyond this. Effectively following an Orientalism (Said, 
1978) argument, he states that it was ‘not the simple claim to Arab ancestry which 
elevated Northern Sudan to its hegemonic position... Rather, it was their opportunistic 
appropriation of modernity that was once the preserve of British colonial staff’ (p.8). 
Darfur is 100% Muslim and many groups have better claims to ‘Arab’ identity than do 
the northern elite: ‘Nomadic groups like the Kababish, the Ziyadiya, the Rashaida and 
the Zibaidiya can all profess Arab identity to an extent that cannot be matched by the 
                                                                 
2 The escalation of known and estimated fatalities can be seen clearly during 2004. The BBC in April 
used a figure of 10,000. By August, a report by UN Representative Francis Deng referred to 30-50,000.  
London Times (Rice, 2004) and AP journalists (AP, 2004) in December gave 70,000. USAID had said in 
early May that 100,000 casualties were probably inevitable, and that 350,000 were quite possible by the 
end of the year (Africa Confidential, 2004). Language also escalated as the international community 
began to fully recognise the nature of the conflict – Kofi Annan referred to ongoing ‘ethnic cleansing’ in 
April, Colin Powell to ‘genocide’ in September (Slim, 2004).  
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current hegemonic groups in the country. However, in the current discourse of power, 
they are classified as essentially backwards and at odds with modernity’ (p.8). 
 
The authors of the Black Book sought to show the effect of this discourse on access to 
power in the Sudan. To do this, they determined the regional origins of each minister 
appointed in each government from independence in 1956 until 2000, and compared it 
with the underlying population distribution. This data is summarised in table 1, and 
shows how the ministerial share of the northern region varied between 60% and 80%, 
with the sole exception of the second democratic period (1986-89) when the share fell to 
47%. The northern regions’ population makes up less than 5% of the total.   
 
The claim of the authors, which is expanded upon to some extent in part II 
(Anonymous, 2004b; Arabic version 2002),
4 is that this distortion had real and 
significant effects on the performance of government duties at every level – from the 
employment of outsiders to work on oil fields inconveniently located in marginalised 
regions, to the allocation of funds for public health expenditure. Disproportionate access 
to power brought disproportionate provision of government support, and unfairly 
reduced the human development opportunities of the marginalised. 
 
This paper seeks to evaluate the validity of the Black Book’s claim. The authors were 
later revealed to be associated with one of the two Darfur rebel groups, the Justice and 
Equality Movement, so it should in no way be seen as neutral in regard to the current 
conflict. As a basis for making greater demands in negotiations, claims of unfair 
treatment are of course likely to be helpful. If the claims are borne out however, there 
are important implications not only for the settlement eventually reached but for the 
conduct of the large-scale development effort that will follow. 
 
Section 2 compares the basic economic and human development performance of Sudan 
with each of the neighbouring countries, and assesses the relative strengths and 
weaknesses. Section 3 sets out the available data on government and state finances, 
including deriving the regional pattern of central subsidy and contribution. The extent of 
development expenditure per capita is also calculated. Section 4 constructs and 
examines regional data on education and health indicators, to assess whether these 
patterns of expenditure and finance have results in terms of the human development 
opportunities for the inhabitants of different areas of the Sudan. Finally, section 5 draws 
conclusions about the validity of the claims made in the Black Book. 
 
2. ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT 
 
Sudan has Libya and Egypt to the north, Chad and the Central African Republic 
(C.A.R.) to the west, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya and Uganda to the 
south, and Eritrea and Ethiopia to the east. While Sudan is the largest country in Africa, 
its population is relatively small at around 32 million – similar to Kenya but less than 
half that of Egypt or Ethiopia.  
 
                                                                 
4 Part II had apparently been intended to provide considerably greater detail on policy effects of the bias 
in ministerial selection, but in the event was largely devoted to an absolute proof of the truth of the first 
part. The government had contested the statistics summarised in table 1, so to remove doubt the names of 
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As Table 2 shows, Sudan ranked 138 out of 175 in the 2003 Human Development 
Index, behind the two northern neighbours but ahead of all others.  The same pattern is 
exhibited for GDP per capita and for life expectancy. In terms of the latter however, the 
absolute advantage that the Sudan had in 1970-75 has diminished over time and Egypt 
and Libya are now considerably advanced.  
 
Figure 1 suggests Sudan has seen stable progress on basic indicators in recent years. 
Panel a shows only Uganda performing better in economic growth terms over 1997-
2002, and the latter has since faced serious problems. In per capita terms (panel b), 
Sudan’s progress has been slower but steady. Since 1997, an IMF-monitored 
macroeconomic stabilisation package has been in place, involving most of the standard 
elements – privatisation of state-owned enterprises, significant and valuable inflation 
reduction, reduced taxation of the corporate sector and incentives to foreign investment.  
The growth rates seen in panel a of figure 3 reflect some combination of the package’s 
success and the important role of oil. 
 
Looking at the country’s economic structure (table 3) underlines the view of Sudan as 
primarily agriculture-driven, but since 1999 it has also exported oil. Agriculture remains 
responsible for more than a third of output, even in the face of this new strength in the 
economy. Crops alone account for 20% of output, livestock another 15%. Services are 
also important, with commerce and hospitality contributing towards 20% and the FIRE 
sector almost 10%. Manufacturing has grown with the advent of oil, though still 
accounts for less than 10% of GDP. 
 
Panel c of figure 1 shows Sudan’s progress in terms of life expectancy, while for many 
sub-Saharan African countries this underwent a reverse with the rapid spread of 
HIV/AIDS. The resulting difference between the sub-Saharan and Middle East/North 
Africa averages is stark. Table 4 shows some of the contributing factors to the l ife 
expectancy pattern. Skilled medical staff attended a relatively high proportion of births 
in Sudan, and the number of trained physicians is relatively high.
5 Most importantly 
however, Sudan continues to exhibit relatively low prevalence of HIV/AIDS, while 
neighbours to the south suffer greatly.  
 
As figure 2 illustrates, half of the variation in life expectancy within this small set of 
neighbours can be empirically explained by the rate of HIV/AIDS prevalence alone.  
Almost identical R² values can be obtained when the dependent variable is instead the 
change in life expectancy from 1970-75 to 2000-05, expressed either in years or as a 
percentage of the value for the first period. Thus Sudan’s relatively strong performance 
on life expectancy may reflect the relatively low prevalence of this disease to date, 
rather than any particular policy success.  
 
Table 5 shows some weaknesses that are masked by Sudan’s relatively strong 
performance in economic growth and average life expectancy terms. On sustainable 
access to drugs, Sudan is in the poorest-performing category with more than half the 
population restricted. Immunisations are relatively limited, especially against 
tuberculosis, and cases of malaria are exceptionally high. Sudan appears to fare well on 
measures of average performance, but poorly on measures of the extent of provision. 
This suggests underlying inequality in distribution. The education measures – relatively 
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low literacy, and exceptionally poor primary school enrolment rates – are consistent 
with this view.  
 
The aggregate and average data provide some reason then to consider the pattern of 
distribution in Sudan. As noted in the World Bank report (2003) however, the country 
faces serious economic inequality without recourse to any regional explanation. The 
report quotes a study by Ibrahim, Elobodi and Holi (2001) that finds extremely high 
Gini coefficients for wage labourers in 1996 of 0.74; 0.72 in urban areas and 0.65 rural. 
Earlier values are much lower but grow quickly: from 0.41 in 1967/8, 0.50 in 1978/80 
and 0.61 in 1990. To begin now to understand whether there is an important regional 
characteristic to the distribution, disaggregated data is required. 
 
3. REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE PATTERNS 
 
Table 6 shows the pattern of total government expenditures  – the sum of central 
government and states’ actual expenditures, and gives some important evidence of why 
education and health measures might be poor.  Average total expenditure on each of 
health and education is consistently only around 1% of GDP across 1998-2000, 
although oil revenues increases from zero to 5% of GDP over the same period. This 
latter explains the rise in total expenditure from 10.7% to 15.5% of GDP. During the 
same period, the total social services budget including health and education increased 
by 0.2% of GDP, while defence and ‘Other’ expenditures went up by 1% and 2.2% of 
GDP respectively. 
 
The pattern of government revenue shares is shown in table 7. Before the advent of oil 
revenues in 1999 and more significantly 2000, indirect taxes make up the largest 
component, growing from twice to three times the size of either direct tax or non-tax 
revenues.  The single largest sub-component has been import duties, followed by excise 
duties. Within direct tax, personal income tax has never been large (as is common in the 
region), while corporate tax revenues halved during the 1990s. Consumption taxes 
including VAT (introduced in 2000) have made up around 10% of total revenue. 
 
To consider any claim of regional bias in expenditure allocation, it is necessary to 
understand first the distribution of regional revenues. Of the main sources of revenue, 
only corporate and consumption taxes have a precise regional allocation since import 
taxes and excise duties are levied on a national basis.  Oil revenues – at least during the 
civil war – were controlled by the central government although extraction is carried out 
in the south. At least within the non-southern regions, no region can lay particular claim 
to this new source of revenue that has lifted the total from around 8% of GDP to over 
11%.   
 
Corporate, consumption and sales taxes including VAT account in total for a share of 
GDP that varies between 1% and 3%, and a share of total revenue between 15% and 
40%. Figure 3 shows the generally downward development of these shares across the 
1990s. It is clear from this that a quite unequal pattern of regional expenditures could be 
generated, with a completely ‘neutral’ central government, if the pattern of economic 
activity that produces these revenues was also unbalanced. To assess the Black Book’s 
claim of bias in the allocation, it is necessary to account for these differences in the 
analysis.  
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The World Bank report (2003) contains state-by-state data on revenues and 
expenditures, for the years 1996-2000.
6 These can be combined to generate regional 
values, according to the allocation of states used by the Black Book and the population 
data for 2001 (both given in table 1). To make a fair comparison between states of 
greatly different size, per capita values are used.
7 The underlying state population data 
is used to avoid problems associated with the small number of gaps in the data.  
 
Per capita total expenditure and total own revenue are shown in columns (1) and (2) of 
table 8a, in Sudan dinars. Both expenditures and revenues are notably larger in the 
North and Central regions than the East and – especially – the West. This could mean be 
the effects of ‘neutral’ central government but differential regional economic strength, 
as discussed above.  
 
To see whether this is the case, column (3) shows the difference between the (own) 
revenue and expenditure values, which gives the effective per capita subsidy from 
central government. This last is positive in almost every case, the exceptions occurring 
in the Central region where states’ own revenues are typically highest.  It is also notably 
lower in the West.  
 
Significant inflation occurred during the period meaning cross-time comparisons are not 
straightforward. To show the effects more clearly then, table 8a also shows the per 
capita values for each region as a percentage of the value for the North, claimed by the 
Black Book to be unfairly favoured. Only the capital state Khartoum has consistently 
higher revenues, while the East is closest, followed by the remaining Central states, then 
finally the West.   
 
The averages shown in the summary table 8b make this pattern clear. While the per 
capita revenues and expenditures of the West are around 44% of those of the North, the 
per capita subsidy of the West is also only 43% that of the North. In effect, the region 
least able to raise its own revenues
8 nonetheless receives central government subsidies 
less than half that of the most able region. The East and Central regions receive lower 
per capita subsidies but are relatively well placed to raise revenues (compared to the 
West) and hence manage much higher expenditure levels.  
 
Finally, data is available for the extent of specifically ‘development’ expenditure. This 
is essentially the forward-looking component of expenditures. The Ministry of Finance 
economic classification of expenditure lists the following categories: wages (34% in 
2000), operation and maintenance (38%), debt service (9%), social subsidies (2%) and 
development (17%). Table 8b shows that the capital state Khartoum is the most well 
provided for in this category, with more than five times the level of expenditure in the 
North, but that the West manages just 17% of the latter. 
 
The stance of the central government in regard to regional allocation has not been 
neutral over the period for which (their own) data are available. The subsidy to the West 
                                                                 
6 There are notable gaps, not least every southern state except Western Equatoria. Data for 2001 are also 
available but only for three states, so these were discarded. 
7 This inevitably adds some small element of inaccuracy, but the changes in population distribution 
between 1996 and 2001 are unlikely to be sufficient to introduce significant bias in the results.  
8 This is presumably due to the relatively low level of economic activity, although unfortunately no 
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is less than half that to the North, despite the former’s own revenues also being much 
lower. It has also been seen that the effect for the development budget has been to leave 
the West with less than one fifth of the per capita funds.  The question this raises is 
whether the bias in allocation has been sufficient to generate real differences in 
development outcomes, or if the authors of the Black Book have exaggerated its actual 
impact.  
 
4. REGIONAL HUMAN DEVELOPMENT OUTCOMES 
 
Table 9 shows the population distribution across the regions, as grouped (under the old 
system of states) in the Black Book. Around a third of the total population lives in urban 
areas, and these are centred in Khartoum. Darfur is the most rural area, followed by 
Kordofan and then the North.   
 
Table 10 shows how the key health outcomes of infant mortality and life expectancy 
differ from one region to another, for 1993 - the last year for which reliable data is 
readily available, as used by the World Bank in its June 2003 country report. Life 
expectancy for women varies from 49.2 years in the South, 53.6 in the East and 56.4 in 
the West, up to 58.8 in the North and 59.8 in Khartoum  – women from ‘marginal’ 
regions outside the civil war in the south lived on average between two-and-a-half and 
five years fewer than those from the North.   
 
The pattern is different among men, with the expected low values in the South where 
the war was entering its second decade, and the highest in the Central region. Those 
from the West were expected to just outlive those from the North, the East lagging a 
year behind. 
 
Infant mortality shows a much clearer pattern, and the differences are considerable: 
male infant mortality is more than 20% higher in the West and East regions, and almost 
50% higher in the South, than in the North. Only Khartoum fares better, and then only 
marginally. A similar pattern holds for female infant mortality.   
 
Table 11 gives a strong clue as to what type of determinant this pattern is likely to have. 
It shows the presence (or otherwise) of medical personnel at the birth of children in each 
region, and here the differences are stark. While doctors attend half of births in the 
North, and more than 40% in Khartoum, the corresponding figure for the West is just 
10%. A doctor or health visitor attended more than 70% of births in the North, but only 
a third of this number in the West.  Almost 45% of births in the West are completely 
unattended, but only 15% of those in the North. This supports the view that differences 
in infant mortality can be traced back, at least in part, to the provision of medical care 
through public health expenditure – rather than through differences in some endogenous 
regional characteristic.  
 
Vaccination rates (not reported in full here, but available in table A1.13 of the statistical 
appendix to the World Bank’s 2003 report) support this also. For example, more than 
60% of children aged 12-23 months in each of the Northern states have had measles 
vaccinations; the equivalent values in the West are North Darfur 46.8%, South Darfur 
28.5% and West Darfur 21.5%. The value for the war-torn South is 51.1%. 
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In reference to the relatively low prevalence of HIV/AIDS in the Sudan noted in section 
2 above, it seems reasonable to imagine that the danger of higher rates of infection (not 
least from the countries to the south) is significant. Bearing this in mind, and given the 
existing 2.6% prevalence rate, knowledge of HIV/AIDS is an important indicator of 
defence against the disease. The number of women who have heard of the disease 
ranges from 70% in Khartoum and 48-59% in the Northern states, down to 20.5% in 
West Darfur. In the South, a value of 67% was recorded. Other indicators of knowledge 
show similar disparities, which seem again to confirm a relative public health neglect 
for the West at least.
9  
 
These health data all refer to one point in time, and given the effective disengagement of 
the international community in the early 1990s it is difficult to find comparable data 
with which to measure changes. In the case of education data however, this is possible 
to a limited extent.   
 
Table 12 shows regional averages for literacy and primary education enrolment rates, 
again calculated using the state-level data and the 2001 population data (source as per 
table 9). The first four columns of data are the most recently available, provided to the 
World Bank by the Ministry of Education in 2002 – before any fighting had occurred in 
the west of the Sudan, and hence showing pre-conflict comparable data.  
 
What these data reveal is rates of adult literacy in Darfur and Kordofan which at around 
38% of the population older than 15 years are barely half that of the North and 
Khartoum.  The East fares somewhat better, with rates of around 43%. The values in 
each case are relatively similar for both male and female.  Gross enrolment rates show a 
pattern likely to exacerbate rather than ameliorate the extent of this inequality. While 
two-thirds of possible school pupils enrol in the North, and three-quarters in Khartoum, 
less than half do so in the West and East and less than 40% in Kordofan.  
 
Using earlier literacy data from 1993, it is possible to track (subject to differences in 
methodology) how this key educational outcome changed across regions over the 
following ten-year period.  In this way, questions about the current government can be 
answered. If these data are taken as broadly reflecting the position inherited by the 
coup-leaders in 1989, and therefore the culmination of historical economic, social and 
policy-related influences, then the relative performance of regions over the decade will 
show the effect of policies pursued since then (and the period immediately beforehand, 
allowing for a lag). 
 
With major donors withdrawing and various sanctions regimes imposed (e.g. by the US 
in 1997), the period 1993-2002 was a difficult one for the Sudan, even allowing for the 
economic upturn seen in figure 1. Against this backdrop, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
there was on average a fall in literacy rates.  With a general push to improve gender 
equality in education, female literacy rates rose in every region; but at the same time 
every region also saw a fall in male literacy rates.   
 
These common elements mask a clear regional pattern. For total literacy rates, the only 
region to see a rise was the North (10.6%). The Central region fell least (2.6%) thanks 
to a rise in Khartoum state, followed by the West (10.2%) and then the East (13.8%).  
Underlying this is a more complex pattern of gender differences. The West’s overall fall 
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is lower because it achieved the greatest relative increase (from the lowest base) in 
female literacy rates. But the male literacy rate fell by more than a third, compared to a 




The Black Book of Sudan (Anonymous, 2004a and 2004b in English translation) sets 
out data showing the disproportionate access to power – since independence in 1956 – 
of the 5% of the population f rom the Northern states.  It further makes the claim that 
this has led to distorted distribution of government resources and therefore of 
development opportunities.  This paper has used the most recent reliable data, much of 
it provided by the current government itself, to explore this claim. The results offer 
overwhelming support.   
 
Section 2 looked at the national performance of Sudan and the neighbouring countries, 
and found its performance to be generally strong in terms of average economic growth 
and life expectancy (although the latter was argued to be at least in part the result of 
relatively low HIV/AIDS prevalence). On measures of the extent of allocation (such as 
disease immunisations, or school enrolment rates) however, Sudan’s performance was 
seen to be relatively weak. This suggested an uneven distribution within the country. 
 
In section 3, state data on own revenues and expenditures was used to calculate regional 
averages.  Two main results emerged.  First, the Northern region and capital state 
Khartoum have much higher per capita expenditures and revenues than any other area, 
more than twice those of the West (Darfur and Kordofan).  This is likely however to be 
due to existing differences in economic performance rather than government policy.  
The second result is that in spite of this large existing difference in the ability of regions 
to raise their own revenues, per capita levels of government subsidy to states are biased 
in the same direction: the northern states enjoy a subsidy more than twice that offered to 
the West.  Unsurprisingly perhaps, per capita development expenditure in the West has 
run at less than a fifth of that of the North.  
 
Section 4 then examined whether there were significant human development impacts of 
government favouring the North and Khartoum at the expense of the West (and, to a 
lesser extent, the Central region excluding Khartoum and the East). Such effects were 
found.  Access to healthcare – in terms of e.g. presence of trained medical people during 
births, or provision of immunisation – was shown to be unbalanced, with the resultant 
patterns of infant mortality and female (but not male) life expectancy being clearly 
stacked against the population of the West.  Less than a quarter of mothers in the West 
will have a doctor or health visitor present during birth, compared to more than two-
thirds in the North; female life expectancy is 2.4 years shorter, and the chances of dying 
in infancy are 20% higher.  
 
Education outcomes exhibited similar patterns, with literacy and enrolment rates 
notably higher in the North and Khartoum than elsewhere, indeed towards twice the 
levels in the West. Here it was possible to track changes in literacy from 1993-2002, 
and specifically assess the changes under the 1989 dictatorship.  While literacy rates in 
the North rose by 10%, they fell everywhere else: in the Central region (even including 
Khartoum) by 2.6%, in the East by 13.8% and in the West by 10.2%. Male literacy fell 
by a third in the West, compared to just 3% in the North. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS121              Page 10 
 
   
 
There can be no doubt that the current dictatorship has been pernicious for the human 
development of the regions outside of the North and Khartoum. There can be no 
question that the data support the claims made in the Black Book that the Sudan has 
been governed to benefit those regions disproportionately at the expense of all others  – 
who account for 80% of the population, or around 25 million people.  While data here 
has only referred to the more recent period, the Black Book data on access to power 
goes back to 1956, encompassing a range of governments from military and Islamic 
dictatorships to democracy, with the Northern bias a constant factor – the apparent 
robustness of this phenomenon to political change should not be overlooked.  
 
There are a number of implications of the validation of the Black Book’s central claims. 
In particular, the current negotiations should be required to take this into account. While 
speed is clearly essential to minimise the immediate casualties being inflicted and to 
ensure the safety of the millions displaced,
10 it should not be a factor in allowing a 
flawed settlement. The determinants of the conflict must be addressed if any resolution 
is to create the conditions for a long-term peace. 
 
The large-scale development effort that is awaiting the conclusion of negotiations and 
normalisation of relations should also make clear use of data on regional disparities and 
past regional treatment. While the African Development Bank, European Commission 
and World Bank reports on Sudan (ADB, 2004; EC, 2002; WB, 2003) all make some 
reference to regional differences, and the latter provides almost all the data used to carry 
out the regional analysis here, there is an understandable reluctance to take on what may 
be perceived as political questions. This attitude cannot however be allowed to affect 
the work which takes place after a resolution is reached, if the long-term conditions for 
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forces and logistics, possibly freed up by the peace deal with the southern rebels. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS121              Page 11 
 
   
Table 1: Sudanese governments – regional representation (%) 
 






















Region  States  Population 
share (2001)  1954-64  1964-69  1969-85  1985-86  1986-89  Jun 1989  Jul 1989- 
Dec 1999  Dec 1999 
Eastern 
 
Gadharif, Kasala, Red Sea 
 
11.7  1.4  2.05  2.5  0  2.6  0  3  3.3 
Northern 
 
Northern, River Nile 
 
4.7  79  67.9  68.7  70  47.4  66.7  59.4  60.1 
Central 
Blue Nile, Gezira, Khartoum, 




2.8  6.2  16.5  10  14.7  0  8.9  6.6 
Southern 
Bahr Alghazal, 




16  17.3  7.8  16.7  12.9  13.3  14.9  13.3 
Western 
 
Darfur, Kordofan  
 
30.6  0  6.2  3.5  3.3  22.4  20  13.8  16.7 
 
Source: Anonymous (2004a), collated from various tables, except population data from World Bank – see table 9 below.QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS121              Page 12 
 
   
 










GDP per capita  
(US$) 
Life expectancy at birth 
(years) 
  Value  Rank  2001  2001  2001  1970-75  2000-05 
Sudan  0.503  138  32.2  12.5  395  52.8  55.6 
C.A.R.  0.363  168  3.8  1.0  257  52.1  39.5 
Chad  0.376  165  8.1  1.6  202  43.6  44.7 
Congo, DR  0.363  167  49.8  5.2  99  50.9  41.8 
Egypt  0.648  120  69.1  98.5  1511  46.3  68.8 
Eritrea  0.446  155  3.8  0.7  164  44.3  52.7 
Ethiopia  0.359  169  67.3  6.2  95  39.0  45.5 
Kenya  0.489  146  31.1  11.4  371  45.8  44.6 
Libya  0.783  61  5.3  34.1  6453  43.0  72.8 
Uganda  0.489  147  24.2  5.7  249  41.8  46.2 
 




Table 3: Structure of Sudanese economy (sectors by share of GDP, %) 
 
  1996  1997  1998    2002* 
Agriculture  41.9  45.0  39.1    35.8 
Crops  20.0  21.6  19.8    20.6 
Irrigated  8.4  11.6  10.9    8.3 
Rain-fed mechanized  4.1  1.7  1.9    6.3 
Rain-fed traditional  7.5  8.3  7.0    6.0 
Livestock  21.1  22.8  18.8    14.8 
Forestry  0.5  0.3  0.3    0.3 
Fishing  0.3  0.3  0.2    0.2 
Industry  13.4  11.3  14.6    23.5 
Petroleum  0.0  0.0  0.0    8.4 
Other mining and quarrying  0.4  0.3  0.3    0.1 
Manufacturing and handicrafts  7.9  6.2  5.8    8.7 
Electricity and water  0.7  0.4  0.6    0.9 
Construction  4.4  4.4  7.9    5.4 
Services  44.7  43.7  46.3    40.7 
Commerce, restaurant and hotels  18.2  15.7  16.2    18.8 
Transport and communication  11.4  9.2  11.3    7.5 
Finance, insurance, real estate   8.0  8.0  8.0    9.6 
Government services  2.8  3.0  3.6    2.8 
Other services  4.3  7.8  7.2    2.0 
GDP at market prices  100.0  100.0  100.0    100.0 
 
Source: ADB (2004); Central Bureau of Statistics, ADF's mission estimates. 
Note: * 2002 values are estimates. 
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Table 4: Sudan and neighbours - contributing factors to life expectancy  
 
 
Births attended by skilled 
health personnel (%) 
Physicians  
(per 100,000 people) 
HIV/AIDS prevalence 
(% of adults) 
  1995-2001  1990-2002  2001 
Sudan  86  16  2.60 
C.A.R.  44  4  12.90 
Chad  16  3  3.61 
Congo, DR  61  7  4.90 
Egypt  61  218  <0.10 
Eritrea  21  5  2.80 
Ethiopia  6  3  6.41 
Kenya  44  14  15.01 
Libya  94  120  0.24 
Uganda  39  5  5.00 
 











One-year-olds (%) fully 
immunized against: 
Cases  







    Tuberculosis  Measles  Tuberculosis  Malaria     
  1999  2001  2001  2001  2000  2001  2000-01 
Sudan  0-49  51  67  142  13934  58.8  34 
C.A.R.  50-79  38  29  255  2207  48.2  24 
Chad  0-49  44  36  168  197  44.2  33 
Congo, DR  ..  57  46  184  296  62.7  27 
Egypt  80-94  98  97  23  (,)  56.1  76 
Eritrea  50-79  98  88  249  3479  56.7  33 
Ethiopia  50-79  76  52  179  556  40.3  34 
Kenya  0-49  91  76  289  545  83.3  52 
Libya  95-100  99  93  11  2  80.8  89 
Uganda  50-79  81  61  187  46  68.0  71 
 
Source: UN (Human Development Report 2003).  
Notes: Column 1 gives the percentage of the population with sustainable access to affordable 
essential drugs, column 7 the combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio.  
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Table 6: Total government expenditure: 
Federal and states' actual recurrent and capital expenditure, (% GDP) 
 
    1998  1999  2000 
Administrative services    2.8  2.8  3.1 
Defense and security    1.8  2.3  2.8 
Social services    2.8  2.1  3.0 
Education    1.5  1.0  1.1 
Health    0.9  0.7  0.8 
Social subsidies'    0.4  0.3  1.1 
Economic services    2.6  2.1  3.4 
Agriculture    0.7  0.6  0.7 
Irrigation    0.4  0.5  0.9 
Drinking water    0.3  0.3  0.4 
Industry    0.3  0.1  0.7 
Transport    0.5  0.3  0.6 
Energy    0.3  0.4  0.4 
Other    0.7  2.3  2.9 
Total    10.7  11.7  15.5 
 
Source: World Bank, 2003; from Sudan Ministry of Finance and National Economy. 
Note: 1. ‘Social subsidies’ includes subsidies to the student loan fund, hospitals, and for 
electncity. 
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Table 7: Sudan government sources of revenue, 1991-2000 
 
  1991-1993  1994-6  1997-99  2000 
Shares of total revenue (%)         
Tax revenue   73.3  79.4  79.8  48.7 
Indirect taxes   47.4  49.9  60.6  32.1 
Sales tax**   5.7  2.5  2.3  1.1 
Import duties   15.3  19.3  23.8  15.8 
Excise duties   11.4  14.4  15.0  9.6 
Export duties & royalties  2.7  2.7  1.6  0.1 
Consumption tax*   10.6  9.1  9.7  2.9 
Direct taxes   23.9  27.8  19.3  11.6 
Personal Income taxes   1.2  1.9  2.0  1.6 
Corporate income tax   18.9  20.2  7.5  7.1 
Sudanese working abroad   1.7  2.6  3.1  0.8 
Other tax  2.2  2.8  6.2  1.5 
Development tax   0.0  0.2  0.4  0.6 
Other taxes   2.0  1.7  0.0  0.0 
VAT**   0.0  0.0  0.0  5.0 
Non tax revenue   26.7  20.7  20.9  51.3 
Proceeds from Govt enterprises, 
interest, rent & dividend  2.2  3.0  5.7  4.9 
Fees & charges on public services   4.7  7.7  5.5  2.8 
Commodity price differentials   8.5  5.8  0.0  0.0 
Proceeds from sales of public 
enterprises & land 
1.7  1.7  0.1  0.0 
Pension contribution   0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Oil revenue   0.0  0.0  3.2  43.6 
Loan repayments   0.8  0.3  0.0  0.0 
Others  8.9  1.9  6.4  0.0 
Total revenue   100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Shares of GDP(%)         
Tax revenue   6.2  6.5  6.1  5.4 
Non tax revenue   2.3  1.7  1.6  5.7 
Total revenue   8.5  8.0  7.7  11.2 
 
Source: Calculated from World Bank, 2003; Ministry of Finance and National Economy and 
IMF estimates.  
Note: Some subtotals do not sum accurately in original data. Consumption tax and defence tax 
have been used interchangeably. 
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Table 8a: Regional revenues and expenditure, 1996-2000 
 






FY  Exp  Rev  Sub  Dev Exp  Exp  Rev  Sub  Dev Exp 
North  2  1996  1116.5  805.7  310.9  80.3  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
(2)  2  1997  1932.6  1525.5  407.0  243.9  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
  2  1998  2861.3  2176.6  684.6  505.5  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
  2  1999  3369.4  2570.1  799.3  545.1  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
  2  2000  4426.8  2793.2  1633.6  928.1  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Central  5  1996  1223.9  1208.2  15.6  398.1  109.6  150.0  5.0  495.9 
(5)  5  1997  2096.7  2045.5  51.1  603.4  108.5  134.1  12.6  247.4 
  5  1998  3165.4  3172.2  -6.8  1124.0  110.6  145.7  -1.0  222.4 
  5  1999  3541.0  3381.5  159.5  1201.5  105.1  131.6  20.0  220.4 
  3  2000  3821.4  3048.1  773.3  383.8  86.3  109.1  47.3  41.4 
Khartoum  1  1996  2028.3  1783.6  244.7  881.6  181.7  221.4  78.7  1098.1 
(1)  1  1997  3191.5  3166.5  24.9  1312.3  165.1  207.6  6.1  538.1 
  1  1998  5005.9  5127.1  -121.2  2321.9  175.0  235.6  -17.7  459.3 
  1  1999  5991.9  5994.0  -2.1  2705.7  177.8  233.2  -0.3  496.4 
  1  2000  4767.9  4770.4  -2.5  671.2  107.7  170.8  -0.2  72.3 
4  1996  644.3  793.7  -149.4  49.7  57.7  98.5  -48.1  62.0  Central ex. 
Khartoum  4  1997  1307.9  1237.9  70.0  92.6  67.7  81.1  17.2  38.0 
(4)  4  1998  1839.5  1763.8  75.6  261.0  64.3  81.0  11.0  51.6 
  4  1999  1775.3  1499.3  275.9  117.8  52.7  58.3  34.5  21.6 
  2  2000  2690.7  990.6  1700.1  40.5  60.8  35.5  104.1  4.4 
East  3  1996  912.2  943.1  -30.9  163.9  81.7  117.1  -10.0  204.2 
(3)  3  1997  1455.5  1521.7  -66.2  197.9  75.3  99.7  -16.3  81.2 
  3  1998  1923.6  2279.8  -356.2  154.9  67.2  104.7  -52.0  30.6 
  3  1999  2633.7  2240.6  393.1  298.2  78.2  87.2  49.2  54.7 
  3  2000  2931.1  2323.0  608.1  246.3  66.2  83.2  37.2  26.5 
West  6  1996  521.6  389.1  132.5  22.2  46.7  48.3  42.6  27.6 
(6)  6  1997  742.3  691.1  51.2  56.9  38.4  45.3  12.6  23.3 
  5  1998  1090.2  877.7  212.5  50.4  38.1  40.3  31.0  10.0 
  3  1999  1815.5  1164.2  651.3  93.1  53.9  45.3  81.5  17.1 
  2  2000  1922.2  1125.5  796.7  67.0  43.4  40.3  48.8  7.2 
Darfur  3  1996  546.5  423.0  123.5  28.2  48.9  52.5  39.7  35.1 
(3)  3  1997  730.0  701.3  28.7  72.5  37.8  46.0  7.1  29.7 
  3  1998  965.8  733.1  232.8  28.4  33.8  33.7  34.0  5.6 
  2  1999  1320.1  1024.3  295.8  80.4  39.2  39.9  37.0  14.7 
  1  2000  1929.1  987.0  942.1  8.5  43.6  35.3  57.7  0.9 
Kordofan  3  1996  456.1  299.9  156.2  6.4  40.8  37.2  50.2  8.0 
(3)  3  1997  761.8  675.1  86.8  32.3  39.4  44.3  21.3  13.2 
  2  1998  1370.7  1203.8  166.9  100.1  47.9  55.3  24.4  19.8 
  1  1999  2631.1  1394.5  1236.6  114.0  78.1  54.3  154.7  20.9 
  1  2000  1913.1  1307.4  605.7  143.9  43.2  46.8  37.1  15.5 
 
Source: calculated from state finance data in table A6.4 in the Statistical Appendix to World 
Bank (2003); original source given as Ministry of Finance and National Economy, National 
Accounts Directorate General. Population data used to calculate the per capita values is for 2001, 
from World Bank, 2003; original source given as United Nations Population Fund, Sudan.  
 
Note: Exp: total expenditure per capita, Rev: total own revenue per capita, Sub: implied subsidy 
per capita from central government, Dev Exp: per capita development expenditure, FY: fiscal 
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Table 8b: Regional revenues and expenditure,  















North  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Central  104.0  134.1  16.8  245.5 
Khartoum  161.5  213.7  13.3  532.9 
Central ex. 
Khartoum 
60.6  70.9  23.8  35.5 
East  73.7  98.4  1.6  79.5 
West  44.1  43.9  43.3  17.0 
Darfur  40.6  41.5  35.1  17.2 
Kordofan  49.9  47.6  57.5  15.5 
 
Source: Calculated from table 8a. 
 
 
Table 9: Population distribution: Sudan, 2001 
 
  Population    Urban pop. 
  (000)   (% of Sudan)   (% of region)  
North  1511  4.7  26.4 
East  3746  11.7  37.3 
Central  11787  36.9  52.2 
  Khartoum  4936  15.5  86.7 
  ex. Khartoum  6851  21.5  27.4 
West  9753  30.6  20.9 
  Darfur  5976  18.7  17.9 
  Kordofan  3777  11.8  25.7 
South  5116  16.0  19.6 
Total  31913  100.0  34.5 
 
Source: Constructed by the author using data from World Bank, 2003; sourced originally from 
United Nations Population Fund, Sudan. 
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Table 10: Infant mortality and life expectancy by region 
 
  Infant Mortality rate, 1993   Life expectancy at birth, 1993  
  Males   Females  Males   Females 
North  100.1  88.8  52.6  58.8 
East  122.0  109.6  51.6  53.6 
Central  104.8  88.8  55.1  59.0 
  Khartoum  98.0  85.0  56.1  59.8 
  ex. Khartoum  109.7  91.5  54.4  58.4 
West  122.5  104.2  52.7  56.4 
  Darfur  120.1  102.6  53.2  56.8 
  Kordofan  126.5  106.9  52.0  55.8 
South  147.5  126.5  46.5  49.2 
Sudan  134.0  115.0  52.5  55.5 
 
Source: Constructed by the author using data from World Bank, 2003; sourced originally from 
United Nations Population Fund, Sudan. 
 
 
Table 11: Attendants for women giving birth, 1999/2000 
 
 








TBA  Other  Unattended 
North  50.1  20.0  9.3  5.5  0.0  0.2  14.9 
East  28.5  25.6  11.9  12.6  0.4  1.0  20.0 
Central  37.2  20.8  16.4  11.0  0.3  0.3  14.2 
Khartoum  42.9 22.3 10.8 16.8  0.3 0.1 6.8
Central ex. 
Khartoum  33.0 19.7 20.4 6.8  0.2 0.4 19.5
West  10.2  12.8  17.8  12.0  1.1  1.3  44.8 
Darfur  9.1 10.4 16.1 6.3  0.9 1.0 56.2
Kordofan  12.1 16.6 20.3 21.0  1.4 1.9 26.7
 
 
Source: constructed using population data and World Bank, 2003; original source UNICEF, 
Multiple Indicators Cluster Survey, 2000, and Safe Motherhood Survey, 1999 – attendants to 
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Table 12: Literacy and primary school enrollment rates and trends by region 
 
























North  71.6  72.0  71.3  82.4  64.8  74.1  56.5  10.6  -2.9  26.1 
East  42.8  43.5  42.5  42.5  49.7  61.3  37.7  -13.8  -29.0  12.9 
Central  62.4  64.7  61.8  74.9  64.1  73.4  54.6  -2.6  -11.8  13.1 
  Khartoum  74.9  75.9  73.9  82.8  73.6  81.1  65.0  1.8  -6.4  13.7 
  Ex. Khartoum  53.4  54.0  53.1  70.4  57.3  67.9  47.1  -6.6  -20.5  12.7 
West  37.9  39.0  37.1  44.2  42.2  58.8  25.9  -10.2  -33.6  43.3 
  Darfur  38.6  39.8  37.4  45.5  44.4  63.2  24.0  -13.1  -37.0  56.2 
  Kordofan  37.0  37.6  36.5  42.3  38.9  51.9  28.9  -5.0  -27.4  26.3 
South  na  na  na  11.6  51.3  64.6  38.7  na  na  na 
 
Source: Constructed by the author using underlying data from World Bank, 2003; sourced originally from  
Directorate of Planning Ministry of Education, March 2002.  
Note: No data are available for literacy rates in the South after 1993.  
* Data are as provided by the Ministry of Education in 2002; the exact date is not given.  
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Figure 1: Performance of Sudan and neighbours, 1970-2002 
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Figure 2: Scatterplot of life expectancy, 2000-05 vs HIV/AIDS prevalence 
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Source: own calculation from data in tables 2 and 4. 
 
 






































































































































Source: own calculation from World Bank, 2003; Ministry of Finance and National Economy 
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